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To prove the security of quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols, several assumptions have
to be imposed on users’ devices. From an experimental point of view, it is preferable that such
theoretical requirements are feasible and the number of them is small. In this paper, we provide
a security proof of a QKD protocol where the usage of any light source is allowed as long as it
emits two independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) states. Our QKD protocol is composed of
two parts: the first part is characterization of the photon-number statistics of the emitted signals
up to three-photons based on the method [Opt. Exp. 27, 5297 (2019)], followed by running our
differential-phase-shift (DPS) protocol [npj Quantum Inf. 5, 87 (2019)]. It is remarkable that as
long as the light source emits two i.i.d. states, even if we have no prior knowledge of the light
source, we can securely employ it in the QKD protocol. As this result substantially simplifies
the requirements on light sources, it constitutes a significant contribution on realizing truly secure
quantum communication.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) enables two distant
parties Alice and Bob to realize information-theoretically
secure communication [1]. To prove the security of the
QKD protocol, we assume mathematical models on users’
devices. It is preferable that such assumptions are ex-
perimentally feasible and the number of them is small;
otherwise actual devices are hard to satisfy the theoreti-
cal requirements and the security of actual QKD systems
cannot be guaranteed. The gap between the theoretical
models of the actual devices and their physical proper-
ties is one of the major issues in the research field [2], and
tremendous efforts have been made to relax the require-
ments on users’ devices. As for the measurement devices,
we now have a practical and complete solution thanks
to measurement-device-independent QKD [3]. Therefore,
the task left is securing the light sources.
As for the light sources, since actual light sources
never emit symmetrically-encoded single-photon states
assumed in [4–6] nor perfectly phase-randomized co-
herent states supposed in [7–9], previous works have
incorporated actual physical properties into the secu-
rity proofs. For examples, QKD is shown to be se-
cure with the relaxed assumptions such as basis inde-
pendent states [10], discrete phase-randomized coherent
states [11], non-phase-randomized coherent states [12,
13], and asymmetrically-encoded states [14–17]. How-
ever, these previous works could not completely solve the
aforementioned gap problem as experimentalists cannot
verify whether these assumptions are really met in prac-
tice.
In this paper, we solve the gap problem for the light
source that emits either state ρˆ0 or ρˆ1 depending on the
input bit. See Table I for a summary of security proofs
where the actual properties of the light sources are re-
flected. It is notable that our proof does not require
TABLE I: Summary of the security proofs in which
actual properties of the light sources are reflected.
Ref. Protocol Model of the light source
[10] BB84 Any basis-independent four states
[12] BB84 Non-phase-randomized coherent states
[13] 6-state Non-phase-randomized coherent states
[11] BB84 Discrete phase-randomized coherent states
[14–17] 3-state Asymmetrically-encoded three states
This work DPS Any two i.i.d states
any prior knowledge of the emitted signals. Although
the security is guaranteed with any ρˆ0 and ρˆ1, it is ob-
vious that the secret key rate depends on their states.
It is easy to imagine that if ρˆ0 and ρˆ1 are orthogonal
with each other, the security never be guaranteed. This
implies that the expression of the key rate depends on
some parameters that characterize ρˆ0 and ρˆ1. In our
proof, we adopt the photon-number statistics of up to
three photons for their characterizations, which can be
obtained without any knowledge of ρˆ0 and ρˆ1 by using
the method in [18]. We note that our security framework
covers a case where the light source is manufactured by a
malicious party. Even under this situation, by checking
the photon number statistics of the states emitted from
the light source, we can securely employ it for QKD.
After characterizing the photon-number statistics, Alice
and Bob conduct our differential-phase-shift (DPS) QKD
protocol [19], whose secret key rate depends on the char-
acterized photon-number statistics. Note that, the only
difference of our proof and the previous one [19] lies in the
assumption on Alice’s light source, and Bob’s measure-
ment unit and the procedures of the protocol are exactly
the same as those in [19]. In proving the security of our
protocol, we follow the same arguments done in [19].
The paper is organized as follows. In section II, we
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2Light source
bAi = 0<latexit sha1_base64= "N2pV3O1/xOmUdbGf8BTHXguM7LM=">AAACanichVG 7SgNBFD1Z3/EVtVHSiFGxCndFUATBR2Op0ZhA1LC7 TuLgvtjdBDT4A3ZWglYKIuJn2PgDFn6CaKdgY+HNZk FU1DvMzJkz99w5M6O7pvQDooeY0tTc0trW3hHv7Or u6U309W/4TsUzRNZwTMfL65ovTGmLbCADU+RdT2iWb oqcvrdU389VhedLx14P9l2xZWllW5akoQVM5fSi3F 6Yo2IiRWkKY/gnUCOQQhQrTuIKm9iBAwMVWBCwETA2 ocHnVoAKgsvcFmrMeYxkuC9wiDhrK5wlOENjdo/HM q8KEWvzul7TD9UGn2Jy91g5jDG6p2t6oTu6oUd6/7 VWLaxR97LPs97QCrfYezS49vavyuI5wO6n6k/PAUqY Cb1K9u6GTP0WRkNfPTh5WZvNjNXG6YKe2P85PdAt3 8CuvhqXqyJzhjh/gPr9uX+Cjcm0Sml1dSo1vxh9RTu SGMEEv/c05rGMFWRDd8c4xVnsWelXhpRkI1WJRZoB fAll9ANamYvy</latexit><latexit sha1_base64= "N2pV3O1/xOmUdbGf8BTHXguM7LM=">AAACanichVG 7SgNBFD1Z3/EVtVHSiFGxCndFUATBR2Op0ZhA1LC7 TuLgvtjdBDT4A3ZWglYKIuJn2PgDFn6CaKdgY+HNZk FU1DvMzJkz99w5M6O7pvQDooeY0tTc0trW3hHv7Or u6U309W/4TsUzRNZwTMfL65ovTGmLbCADU+RdT2iWb oqcvrdU389VhedLx14P9l2xZWllW5akoQVM5fSi3F 6Yo2IiRWkKY/gnUCOQQhQrTuIKm9iBAwMVWBCwETA2 ocHnVoAKgsvcFmrMeYxkuC9wiDhrK5wlOENjdo/HM q8KEWvzul7TD9UGn2Jy91g5jDG6p2t6oTu6oUd6/7 VWLaxR97LPs97QCrfYezS49vavyuI5wO6n6k/PAUqY Cb1K9u6GTP0WRkNfPTh5WZvNjNXG6YKe2P85PdAt3 8CuvhqXqyJzhjh/gPr9uX+Cjcm0Sml1dSo1vxh9RTu SGMEEv/c05rGMFWRDd8c4xVnsWelXhpRkI1WJRZoB fAll9ANamYvy</latexit><latexit sha1_base64= "N2pV3O1/xOmUdbGf8BTHXguM7LM=">AAACanichVG 7SgNBFD1Z3/EVtVHSiFGxCndFUATBR2Op0ZhA1LC7 TuLgvtjdBDT4A3ZWglYKIuJn2PgDFn6CaKdgY+HNZk FU1DvMzJkz99w5M6O7pvQDooeY0tTc0trW3hHv7Or u6U309W/4TsUzRNZwTMfL65ovTGmLbCADU+RdT2iWb oqcvrdU389VhedLx14P9l2xZWllW5akoQVM5fSi3F 6Yo2IiRWkKY/gnUCOQQhQrTuIKm9iBAwMVWBCwETA2 ocHnVoAKgsvcFmrMeYxkuC9wiDhrK5wlOENjdo/HM q8KEWvzul7TD9UGn2Jy91g5jDG6p2t6oTu6oUd6/7 VWLaxR97LPs97QCrfYezS49vavyuI5wO6n6k/PAUqY Cb1K9u6GTP0WRkNfPTh5WZvNjNXG6YKe2P85PdAt3 8CuvhqXqyJzhjh/gPr9uX+Cjcm0Sml1dSo1vxh9RTu SGMEEv/c05rGMFWRDd8c4xVnsWelXhpRkI1WJRZoB fAll9ANamYvy</latexit><latexit sha1_base64= "N2pV3O1/xOmUdbGf8BTHXguM7LM=">AAACanichVG 7SgNBFD1Z3/EVtVHSiFGxCndFUATBR2Op0ZhA1LC7 TuLgvtjdBDT4A3ZWglYKIuJn2PgDFn6CaKdgY+HNZk FU1DvMzJkz99w5M6O7pvQDooeY0tTc0trW3hHv7Or u6U309W/4TsUzRNZwTMfL65ovTGmLbCADU+RdT2iWb oqcvrdU389VhedLx14P9l2xZWllW5akoQVM5fSi3F 6Yo2IiRWkKY/gnUCOQQhQrTuIKm9iBAwMVWBCwETA2 ocHnVoAKgsvcFmrMeYxkuC9wiDhrK5wlOENjdo/HM q8KEWvzul7TD9UGn2Jy91g5jDG6p2t6oTu6oUd6/7 VWLaxR97LPs97QCrfYezS49vavyuI5wO6n6k/PAUqY Cb1K9u6GTP0WRkNfPTh5WZvNjNXG6YKe2P85PdAt3 8CuvhqXqyJzhjh/gPr9uX+Cjcm0Sml1dSo1vxh9RTu SGMEEv/c05rGMFWRDd8c4xVnsWelXhpRkI1WJRZoB fAll9ANamYvy</latexit>
⇢ˆ0
<latexit sha1_base64="LFkSmgr8yKqH klglzj7eMU6LvN8=">AAACb3ichVHLSsNAFD2Nr1pfVRcKghSLoptyI4LiSnTj0ldt oS0liaMNTZOQTAta+gN+gC5c+AAR8TPc+AMu/ARxJQpuXHibBkRFvcPMnDlzz50zM7 prmb4keogobe0dnV3R7lhPb1//QHxwaNt3qp4h0oZjOV5W13xhmbZIS1NaIut6Qqvo lsjo5ZXmfqYmPN907C2574pCRduzzV3T0CRT+XxJk/W8V3IaRSrGk5SiIBI/gRqCJM JYc+JXyGMHDgxUUYGADcnYggafWw4qCC5zBdSZ8xiZwb5AAzHWVjlLcIbGbJnHPV7l QtbmdbOmH6gNPsXi7rEygUm6p2t6oTu6oUd6/7VWPajR9LLPs97SCrc4cDi6+favqs KzROlT9adniV0sBF5N9u4GTPMWRktfOzh+2VzcmKxP0QU9sf9zeqBbvoFdezUu18XG CWL8Aer35/4JtmdTKqXU9bnk0nL4FVGMYQLT/N7zWMIq1pDmc10c4RRnkWdlRBlXEq 1UJRJqhvEllJkPR5GOsw==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="LFkSmgr8yKqH klglzj7eMU6LvN8=">AAACb3ichVHLSsNAFD2Nr1pfVRcKghSLoptyI4LiSnTj0ldt oS0liaMNTZOQTAta+gN+gC5c+AAR8TPc+AMu/ARxJQpuXHibBkRFvcPMnDlzz50zM7 prmb4keogobe0dnV3R7lhPb1//QHxwaNt3qp4h0oZjOV5W13xhmbZIS1NaIut6Qqvo lsjo5ZXmfqYmPN907C2574pCRduzzV3T0CRT+XxJk/W8V3IaRSrGk5SiIBI/gRqCJM JYc+JXyGMHDgxUUYGADcnYggafWw4qCC5zBdSZ8xiZwb5AAzHWVjlLcIbGbJnHPV7l QtbmdbOmH6gNPsXi7rEygUm6p2t6oTu6oUd6/7VWPajR9LLPs97SCrc4cDi6+favqs KzROlT9adniV0sBF5N9u4GTPMWRktfOzh+2VzcmKxP0QU9sf9zeqBbvoFdezUu18XG CWL8Aer35/4JtmdTKqXU9bnk0nL4FVGMYQLT/N7zWMIq1pDmc10c4RRnkWdlRBlXEq 1UJRJqhvEllJkPR5GOsw==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="LFkSmgr8yKqH klglzj7eMU6LvN8=">AAACb3ichVHLSsNAFD2Nr1pfVRcKghSLoptyI4LiSnTj0ldt oS0liaMNTZOQTAta+gN+gC5c+AAR8TPc+AMu/ARxJQpuXHibBkRFvcPMnDlzz50zM7 prmb4keogobe0dnV3R7lhPb1//QHxwaNt3qp4h0oZjOV5W13xhmbZIS1NaIut6Qqvo lsjo5ZXmfqYmPN907C2574pCRduzzV3T0CRT+XxJk/W8V3IaRSrGk5SiIBI/gRqCJM JYc+JXyGMHDgxUUYGADcnYggafWw4qCC5zBdSZ8xiZwb5AAzHWVjlLcIbGbJnHPV7l QtbmdbOmH6gNPsXi7rEygUm6p2t6oTu6oUd6/7VWPajR9LLPs97SCrc4cDi6+favqs KzROlT9adniV0sBF5N9u4GTPMWRktfOzh+2VzcmKxP0QU9sf9zeqBbvoFdezUu18XG CWL8Aer35/4JtmdTKqXU9bnk0nL4FVGMYQLT/N7zWMIq1pDmc10c4RRnkWdlRBlXEq 1UJRJqhvEllJkPR5GOsw==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="LFkSmgr8yKqH klglzj7eMU6LvN8=">AAACb3ichVHLSsNAFD2Nr1pfVRcKghSLoptyI4LiSnTj0ldt oS0liaMNTZOQTAta+gN+gC5c+AAR8TPc+AMu/ARxJQpuXHibBkRFvcPMnDlzz50zM7 prmb4keogobe0dnV3R7lhPb1//QHxwaNt3qp4h0oZjOV5W13xhmbZIS1NaIut6Qqvo lsjo5ZXmfqYmPN907C2574pCRduzzV3T0CRT+XxJk/W8V3IaRSrGk5SiIBI/gRqCJM JYc+JXyGMHDgxUUYGADcnYggafWw4qCC5zBdSZ8xiZwb5AAzHWVjlLcIbGbJnHPV7l QtbmdbOmH6gNPsXi7rEygUm6p2t6oTu6oUd6/7VWPajR9LLPs97SCrc4cDi6+favqs KzROlT9adniV0sBF5N9u4GTPMWRktfOzh+2VzcmKxP0QU9sf9zeqBbvoFdezUu18XG CWL8Aer35/4JtmdTKqXU9bnk0nL4FVGMYQLT/N7zWMIq1pDmc10c4RRnkWdlRBlXEq 1UJRJqhvEllJkPR5GOsw==</latexit>
Light source
bAi = 1<latexit sha1_base64="Y5tyI0k/DGeRnM68oUMni t2uRaE=">AAACanichVG7SgNBFD1Z3/EVtVHSiFGxCndFUATBR2Op0ZhA1LC7TuLgvtjdBDT4A3ZWglYKIuJ n2PgDFn6CaKdgY+HNZkFU1DvMzJkz99w5M6O7pvQDooeY0tTc0trW3hHv7Oru6U309W/4TsUzRNZwTMfL65o vTGmLbCADU+RdT2iWboqcvrdU389VhedLx14P9l2xZWllW5akoQVM5fSi3F6YU4uJFKUpjOGfQI1AClGsOIk rbGIHDgxUYEHARsDYhAafWwEqCC5zW6gx5zGS4b7AIeKsrXCW4AyN2T0ey7wqRKzN63pNP1QbfIrJ3WPlMMb onq7phe7ohh7p/ddatbBG3cs+z3pDK9xi79Hg2tu/KovnALufqj89ByhhJvQq2bsbMvVbGA199eDkZW02M1Y bpwt6Yv/n9EC3fAO7+mpcrorMGeL8Aer35/4JNibTKqXV1anU/GL0Fe1IYgQT/N7TmMcyVpAN3R3jFGexZ6V fGVKSjVQlFmkG8CWU0Q9cmYvz</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="Y5tyI0k/DGeRnM68oUMni t2uRaE=">AAACanichVG7SgNBFD1Z3/EVtVHSiFGxCndFUATBR2Op0ZhA1LC7TuLgvtjdBDT4A3ZWglYKIuJ n2PgDFn6CaKdgY+HNZkFU1DvMzJkz99w5M6O7pvQDooeY0tTc0trW3hHv7Oru6U309W/4TsUzRNZwTMfL65o vTGmLbCADU+RdT2iWboqcvrdU389VhedLx14P9l2xZWllW5akoQVM5fSi3F6YU4uJFKUpjOGfQI1AClGsOIk rbGIHDgxUYEHARsDYhAafWwEqCC5zW6gx5zGS4b7AIeKsrXCW4AyN2T0ey7wqRKzN63pNP1QbfIrJ3WPlMMb onq7phe7ohh7p/ddatbBG3cs+z3pDK9xi79Hg2tu/KovnALufqj89ByhhJvQq2bsbMvVbGA199eDkZW02M1Y bpwt6Yv/n9EC3fAO7+mpcrorMGeL8Aer35/4JNibTKqXV1anU/GL0Fe1IYgQT/N7TmMcyVpAN3R3jFGexZ6V fGVKSjVQlFmkG8CWU0Q9cmYvz</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="Y5tyI0k/DGeRnM68oUMni t2uRaE=">AAACanichVG7SgNBFD1Z3/EVtVHSiFGxCndFUATBR2Op0ZhA1LC7TuLgvtjdBDT4A3ZWglYKIuJ n2PgDFn6CaKdgY+HNZkFU1DvMzJkz99w5M6O7pvQDooeY0tTc0trW3hHv7Oru6U309W/4TsUzRNZwTMfL65o vTGmLbCADU+RdT2iWboqcvrdU389VhedLx14P9l2xZWllW5akoQVM5fSi3F6YU4uJFKUpjOGfQI1AClGsOIk rbGIHDgxUYEHARsDYhAafWwEqCC5zW6gx5zGS4b7AIeKsrXCW4AyN2T0ey7wqRKzN63pNP1QbfIrJ3WPlMMb onq7phe7ohh7p/ddatbBG3cs+z3pDK9xi79Hg2tu/KovnALufqj89ByhhJvQq2bsbMvVbGA199eDkZW02M1Y bpwt6Yv/n9EC3fAO7+mpcrorMGeL8Aer35/4JNibTKqXV1anU/GL0Fe1IYgQT/N7TmMcyVpAN3R3jFGexZ6V fGVKSjVQlFmkG8CWU0Q9cmYvz</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="Y5tyI0k/DGeRnM68oUMni t2uRaE=">AAACanichVG7SgNBFD1Z3/EVtVHSiFGxCndFUATBR2Op0ZhA1LC7TuLgvtjdBDT4A3ZWglYKIuJ n2PgDFn6CaKdgY+HNZkFU1DvMzJkz99w5M6O7pvQDooeY0tTc0trW3hHv7Oru6U309W/4TsUzRNZwTMfL65o vTGmLbCADU+RdT2iWboqcvrdU389VhedLx14P9l2xZWllW5akoQVM5fSi3F6YU4uJFKUpjOGfQI1AClGsOIk rbGIHDgxUYEHARsDYhAafWwEqCC5zW6gx5zGS4b7AIeKsrXCW4AyN2T0ey7wqRKzN63pNP1QbfIrJ3WPlMMb onq7phe7ohh7p/ddatbBG3cs+z3pDK9xi79Hg2tu/KovnALufqj89ByhhJvQq2bsbMvVbGA199eDkZW02M1Y bpwt6Yv/n9EC3fAO7+mpcrorMGeL8Aer35/4JNibTKqXV1anU/GL0Fe1IYgQT/N7TmMcyVpAN3R3jFGexZ6V fGVKSjVQlFmkG8CWU0Q9cmYvz</latexit>
⇢ˆ1
<latexit sha1_base64="WmtARg7fknu/3JU6TbrsYLpvLOA=">AAACb3ichVHLSsN AFD2Nr1pfVRcKghSLoptyI4LiSnTj0ldtoS0liaMNTZOQTAta+gN+gC5c+AAR8TPc+AMu/ARxJQpuXHibBkRFvcPMnDlzz50zM7prmb4keogobe0dnV3R7lhPb1//QHxwaNt 3qp4h0oZjOV5W13xhmbZIS1NaIut6Qqvolsjo5ZXmfqYmPN907C2574pCRduzzV3T0CRT+XxJk/W8V3IaRbUYT1KKgkj8BGoIkghjzYlfIY8dODBQRQUCNiRjCxp8bjmoILj MFVBnzmNkBvsCDcRYW+UswRkas2Ue93iVC1mb182afqA2+BSLu8fKBCbpnq7phe7ohh7p/dda9aBG08s+z3pLK9ziwOHo5tu/qgrPEqVP1Z+eJXaxEHg12bsbMM1bGC197eD 4ZXNxY7I+RRf0xP7P6YFu+QZ27dW4XBcbJ4jxB6jfn/sn2J5NqZRS1+eSS8vhV0QxhglM83vPYwmrWEOaz3VxhFOcRZ6VEWVcSbRSlUioGcaXUGY+AEmRjrQ=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="WmtARg7fknu/3JU6TbrsYLpvLOA=">AAACb3ichVHLSsN AFD2Nr1pfVRcKghSLoptyI4LiSnTj0ldtoS0liaMNTZOQTAta+gN+gC5c+AAR8TPc+AMu/ARxJQpuXHibBkRFvcPMnDlzz50zM7prmb4keogobe0dnV3R7lhPb1//QHxwaNt 3qp4h0oZjOV5W13xhmbZIS1NaIut6Qqvolsjo5ZXmfqYmPN907C2574pCRduzzV3T0CRT+XxJk/W8V3IaRbUYT1KKgkj8BGoIkghjzYlfIY8dODBQRQUCNiRjCxp8bjmoILj MFVBnzmNkBvsCDcRYW+UswRkas2Ue93iVC1mb182afqA2+BSLu8fKBCbpnq7phe7ohh7p/dda9aBG08s+z3pLK9ziwOHo5tu/qgrPEqVP1Z+eJXaxEHg12bsbMM1bGC197eD 4ZXNxY7I+RRf0xP7P6YFu+QZ27dW4XBcbJ4jxB6jfn/sn2J5NqZRS1+eSS8vhV0QxhglM83vPYwmrWEOaz3VxhFOcRZ6VEWVcSbRSlUioGcaXUGY+AEmRjrQ=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="WmtARg7fknu/3JU6TbrsYLpvLOA=">AAACb3ichVHLSsN AFD2Nr1pfVRcKghSLoptyI4LiSnTj0ldtoS0liaMNTZOQTAta+gN+gC5c+AAR8TPc+AMu/ARxJQpuXHibBkRFvcPMnDlzz50zM7prmb4keogobe0dnV3R7lhPb1//QHxwaNt 3qp4h0oZjOV5W13xhmbZIS1NaIut6Qqvolsjo5ZXmfqYmPN907C2574pCRduzzV3T0CRT+XxJk/W8V3IaRbUYT1KKgkj8BGoIkghjzYlfIY8dODBQRQUCNiRjCxp8bjmoILj MFVBnzmNkBvsCDcRYW+UswRkas2Ue93iVC1mb182afqA2+BSLu8fKBCbpnq7phe7ohh7p/dda9aBG08s+z3pLK9ziwOHo5tu/qgrPEqVP1Z+eJXaxEHg12bsbMM1bGC197eD 4ZXNxY7I+RRf0xP7P6YFu+QZ27dW4XBcbJ4jxB6jfn/sn2J5NqZRS1+eSS8vhV0QxhglM83vPYwmrWEOaz3VxhFOcRZ6VEWVcSbRSlUioGcaXUGY+AEmRjrQ=</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="WmtARg7fknu/3JU6TbrsYLpvLOA=">AAACb3ichVHLSsN AFD2Nr1pfVRcKghSLoptyI4LiSnTj0ldtoS0liaMNTZOQTAta+gN+gC5c+AAR8TPc+AMu/ARxJQpuXHibBkRFvcPMnDlzz50zM7prmb4keogobe0dnV3R7lhPb1//QHxwaNt 3qp4h0oZjOV5W13xhmbZIS1NaIut6Qqvolsjo5ZXmfqYmPN907C2574pCRduzzV3T0CRT+XxJk/W8V3IaRbUYT1KKgkj8BGoIkghjzYlfIY8dODBQRQUCNiRjCxp8bjmoILj MFVBnzmNkBvsCDcRYW+UswRkas2Ue93iVC1mb182afqA2+BSLu8fKBCbpnq7phe7ohh7p/dda9aBG08s+z3pLK9ziwOHo5tu/qgrPEqVP1Z+eJXaxEHg12bsbMM1bGC197eD 4ZXNxY7I+RRf0xP7P6YFu+QZ27dW4XBcbJ4jxB6jfn/sn2J5NqZRS1+eSS8vhV0QxhglM83vPYwmrWEOaz3VxhFOcRZ6VEWVcSbRSlUioGcaXUGY+AEmRjrQ=</latexit>
FIG. 1: Our model of a light source with which we
prove the security. The left (right) figure shows that
when Alice chooses bAi = 0 (b
A
i = 1), the light source
emits state ρˆ0 (ρˆ1). As long as the light source emits
these i.i.d states, no other characterizations are required
on the light source.
Light source
・・・
pulses
Beam splitter
Detector
FIG. 2: The characterization method [18] using a
Hanbury-Brown-Twiss setup with D = 4 threshold
detectors. By monitoring the r-fold coincidence
probabilities for r ∈ {1, ..., D}, Alice obtains all the
parameters in Pchar. Specifically, state ρˆ0 (ρˆ1) is
measured for obtaining pL0 and p
U
0 (p
L
1 and p
U
1 ), and
{ρˆ~bAS }~bA∈{0,1}3 are measured for obtaining {qn}3n=1.
describe the model of the light source and explain the
characterized parameters that come into the expression
of the key rate. The setup and assumptions on Bob’s
measurement unit and the protocol description are ex-
actly the same as those in our previous work [19]. For
self-consistency of this paper, we summarize them in sec-
tions III and IV, respectively. In section V, we outline
the security proof and state our main theorem, whose
proof given in Appendix A. In section VI, we present the
simulation results of the key rate with coherent states.
Finally, section VII summarizes the paper.
II. MODEL OF LIGHT SOURCE
In this section, we explain our model of the light
source, which is illustrated in Fig. 1. Our model is based
on the i.i.d. setting, where the light source emits state
ρˆ0 (ρˆ1) when Alice chooses the bit 0 (1). In the case
of our DPS QKD protocol [19], we consider that three
optical pulses constitute a single-block from which we
try to extract one-bit key. The state of a single-block of
three pulses is described below.
Description of the state of a single-block: For
each block, Alice chooses a random three-bit sequence
~bA := b
A
1 b
A
2 b
A
3 ∈ {0, 1}3, where bAi is encoded only on the
ith pulse in system Si. Depending on ~bA, Alice prepares
a following state in system S := S1S2S3:
ρˆ
~bA
S :=
3⊗
i=1
ρˆ
bAi
Si
. (1)
Here, ρˆ
bAi
Si
denotes a density operator of the ith pulse
when bAi is chosen. We suppose that each system Ri
that purifies state ρˆ
bAi
Si
is possessed by Alice, and Eve
does not have access to system Ri.
We stress that no characterizations beyond the i.i.d.
property are required on the light source. Obviously, the
secret key rate depends on ρˆ0 and ρˆ1 (with ρˆbAi := ρˆ
bAi
Si
),
which can be understood by a following example. If the
states emit more photons with higher probabilities, Eve
obtains more information about the key because of the
photon-number-splitting attack [20]. This means that
the key rate depends on some parameters characterizing
ρˆ0 and ρˆ1. In our proof, we adopt the photon-number
statistics of ρˆ0 and ρˆ1 up to three-photons as will be
shown in Eqs. (2)-(4). These characterized parameters
are estimated before running the DPS protocol.
(C1) Bounds on the vacuum emission probabili-
ties: The vacuum emission probabilities of ρˆ0 and
ρˆ1 are upper and lower bounded as
pL0 ≤ trρˆ0|vac〉〈vac| ≤ pU0 (2)
and
pL1 ≤ trρˆ1|vac〉〈vac| ≤ pU1 , (3)
respectively. Here, |vac〉 denotes the vacuum state.
(C2) Upper bounds on the tail distribution func-
tions of the total photon number in a single-
block: The probability that a single-block of pulses
contains n or more photons for n ∈ {1, 2, 3} is
upper-bounded. That is, for each n,
∞∑
m=n
tr(ρˆbA1 ⊗ ρˆbA2 ⊗ ρˆbA3 )|m〉〈m| ≤ qn (4)
holds for any ~bA ∈ {0, 1}3. Here, |m〉 is the m-
photon number state in all the optical modes.
The characterized parameters
Pchar := {pL0 , pU0 , pL1 , pU1 , q1, q2, q3} (5)
can be obtained by using the method [18] that is based
on the Hanbury-Brown-Twiss setup. This setup em-
ploys, for instance, D = 4 threshold optical detectors and
three beam splitters (whose setup is illustrated in Fig. 2),
3and by monitoring the r-fold coincidence probabilities for
r ∈ {1, ..., D}, tight bounds on each of all the parame-
ters in Pchar can be obtained. The parameters p
L
0 and
pU0 (p
L
1 and p
U
1 ) can be obtained by measuring ρˆ0 (ρˆ1),
and {qn}3n=1 are obtained by measuring {ρˆ
~bA
S }~bA∈{0,1}3 .
Importantly, this method works for any i.i.d states.
After characterizing each of all the parameters in Pchar,
Alice and Bob conduct the DPS QKD protocol. The
setup and assumptions on a measurement unit and the
procedures of the QKD protocol are exactly the same as
those in our previous work [19]. For self-consistency of
this paper, we summarize them in Secs. III and IV.
III. MODEL OF MEASUREMENT UNIT
Here, we list up the assumptions on a measurement
unit.
(B1) Bob employs a one-bit delay Mach-Zehnder in-
terferometer with two 50:50 beam splitters (BSs),
whose delay is equal to the interval of the neigh-
boring emitted pulses.
(B2) After pulses pass through the second BS, the pulses
are detected by two photon-number-resolving
(PNR) detectors that discriminate the vacuum, a
single-photon, and two or more photons of a specific
optical mode. Bob obtains the bit 0 or 1 accord-
ing to which detector has reported the detection.
We assume that the quantum efficiencies and dark
countings are the same for both detectors.
Bob detects photons at time slot 0 through 3, where the
jth (1 ≤ j ≤ 2) time slot is defined as an expected detec-
tion time from the superposition of the jth and (j + 1)th
incoming pulses, and the 0th (3rd) time slot is defined as
an expected detection time from the superposition of the
1st (3rd) incoming pulse and the 3rd incoming pulse in the
previous block (1st incoming pulse in the next block).
IV. PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION
We describe the procedures of the protocol. In its de-
scription, |κ| denotes the length of a bit sequence κ.
(P1) Alice chooses a random three-bit sequence ~bA ∈
{0, 1}3 and sends the corresponding three-pulse
state ρˆ
~bA
S to Bob through a quantum channel.
(P2) We define the event detected if the PNR detectors
have reported one photon in total among the 1st
and 2nd time slots. Depending on which detector
has reported the detection at the jth (1 ≤ j ≤ 2)
time slot, Bob obtains the raw key bit kB ∈ {0, 1}.
If the detected event does not occur, Alice and Bob
skip steps (P3) and (P4).
(P3) Bob announces j via an authenticated public chan-
nel.
(P4) Alice calculates her raw key bit kA = b
A
j ⊕ bAj+1 ∈
{0, 1}.
(P5) Alice and Bob repeat (P1)-(P4) for Nem times.
(P6) Alice randomly selects a small portion of her raw
key as sampled bits for estimating the bit error rate
ebit among them. Through the authenticated pub-
lic channel, Alice and Bob compare the bit values
of the sampled bits and obtain ebit. Using ebit, the
bit error rate in the remaining raw key can be ob-
tained.
(P7) By concatenating their remaining raw keys, Alice
and Bob obtain their sifted keys κA and κB , re-
spectively.
(P8) Bob performs bit error correction on his sifted key
κB by sacrificing the bits |κA|fEC of encrypted
public communication from Alice by consuming the
same length of a pre-shared secret key.
(P9) Alice and Bob perform privacy amplification by
shortening the fraction fPA to obtain the final keys.
In this paper, we only consider the asymptotic secret key
rate, where the following observed parameters are fixed
in the limit of Nem →∞.
0 ≤ Q := |κA|
Nem
≤ 1, 0 ≤ ebit ≤ 1. (6)
V. SECURITY PROOF
In this section, we summarize the security proof of our
protocol and determine the amount of privacy amplifica-
tion QfPA.
A. Notations
In what follows, we adopt the following notations. The
function h(x) is defined as
h(x) =
{
−x log2 x− (1− x) log2(1− x) (0 ≤ x ≤ 0.5)
1 (x > 0.5).
(7)
The Hadamard operator Hˆ is denoted by
Hˆ = 1/
√
2
∑
x,y=0,1
(−1)xy|x〉〈y|. (8)
The Z-basis and X-basis states for jth qubit system
Aj are defined as {|0〉Aj , |1〉Aj} and {|+〉Aj , |−〉Aj} with
|±〉Aj = (|0〉Aj±|1〉Aj )/
√
2, respectively. The controlled-
not (CNOT) gate Uˆ
(j)
CNOT on the Z-basis is defined as
Uˆ
(j)
CNOT|x〉Aj |y〉Aj+1 = |x〉Aj |x+ y mod2〉Aj+1 (9)
with x, y ∈ {0, 1}.
4B. Summary of security proof
Here, we summarize our security proof and state the
main theorem that derives the amount of privacy am-
plification QfPA. The proof of Theorem 1 is given in
Appendix A. For our security proof, we follow the same
arguments done in our previous work [19], which em-
ploys complementarity [21]. The security proof starts
from substituting the following actual steps with the vir-
tual ones.
• Alice’s state preparation in step (P1)
• Alice’s calculation of her raw key bit kA in step (P4)
Regarding Alice’s state preparation in step (P1), she al-
ternatively prepares three auxiliary qubit systems A1, A2
and A3 that remain at Alice’s site and are entangled with
actual states in system S. Specifically, Alice virtually
prepares the following state
|Φ〉ASR := 2−3/2
3⊗
i=1
1∑
bAi =0
Hˆ|bAi 〉Ai |ψbAi 〉SiRi . (10)
Here, |ψbAi 〉SiRi is a purification of ρˆ
bAi
Si
, that is,
trRi |ψbAi 〉〈ψbAi |SiRi = ρˆ
bAi
Si
. Recall that system Ri is as-
sumed to be possessed by Alice.
As for calculation of Alice’s raw key bit kA in step (P4),
she alternatively performs the CNOT gate Uˆ
(j)
CNOT on the
qubits in systems Aj and Aj+1 with the j
th qubit being
the control and the (j + 1)th one being the target. After
performing the CNOT gate, she measures the jth auxil-
iary qubit in the X-basis to obtain kA.
For evaluating the security of the key κA, we consider
the complementary scenario [21]. We define the comple-
mentary observable to the one to obtain kA as the Z-basis
measurement on the jth auxiliary qubit after performing
Uˆ
(j)
CNOT. Let zj denote the outcome of the Z-basis mea-
surement on the jth qubit, and we quantify how well Alice
can predict zj . To enhance the accuracy of her prediction
of zj , she employs the following information.
• The Z-basis measurement outcome on the (j+1)th
qubit after performing Uˆ
(j)
CNOT.
• Bob’s virtual measurement to learn which of the
jth or (j + 1)th time slot has a single-photon.
We define the occurrence of a phase error to be the case
where Alice fails her prediction. The explicit formula
of the POVM element of obtaining a phase error is ex-
pressed in Eq. (A9) in Appendix A. When Nph denotes
the number of phase errors, that is, the number of wrong
predictions on the outcome zj among |κA| trials, the
phase error rate is expressed as eph = Nph/|κA|. Once
we obtain the upper bound f(Q, ebit, Pchar) on Nph as a
function of experimentally observed parameters Q, ebit
in Eq. (6) and Pchar in Eq. (5), a sufficient amount of
privacy amplification in the asymptotic limit of large key
length |κA| is given by [21]
QfPA = Qh
(
f(Q, ebit, Pchar)
|κA|
)
. (11)
Then, the secret key rate per a block is given by
R = Q
[
1− fEC − h
(
f(Q, ebit, Pchar)
|κA|
)]
/3. (12)
The quantity eUph := f(Q, ebit, Pchar)/|κA| in Eq. (12)
is the upper bound on the phase error rate eph. Our
main result, Theorem 1, derives eUph with experimentally
available parameters Q, ebit and Pchar.
Theorem 1 In the asymptotic limit of large key length
|κA|, the upper bound on the phase error rate of the DPS
protocol is given by
eUph = (3 +
√
5)ebit +
(3 +
√
5)
√
sU1 s
U
3 + s
U
≥2
Q
, (13)
where
sU3 := q3 + t
3 + 6t2 + 3t, (14)
sU1 := q1 + 3t, (15)
sU≥2 := q2 + t
3 + 9t2 + 6t (16)
with
t :=
max
{
(
√
pU0 −
√
pL1 )
2, (
√
pL0 −
√
pU1 )
2
}
4
. (17)
VI. SIMULATION OF SECRET KEY RATE
In this section, we show the simulation results of the
key rate as a function of the channel transmittance η in-
cluding the detection efficiency. For the simulation pur-
pose, we suppose that each emitted pulse is a coherent
pulse; the states ρˆ0 and ρˆ1 are assumed to be given by
ρˆ0 = |√µ0〉〈√µ0| and ρˆ1 = |√µ1〉〈√µ1|, respectively.
Here, |√µ〉 := e−µ2 ∑∞n=0 µn2√n! |n〉. We consider that the
mean photon numbers µ0 and µ1 fluctuate by a% from
an expected one µ, namely, µ0 and µ1 lie in the range
[(1− 0.01a)µ, (1 + 0.01a)µ]. Note that we do not assume
that µ0 = µ1. In this case, the bounds on the vacuum
emission probabilities are written as
pU0 = p
U
1 = e
−(1−0.01a)µ (18)
and
pL0 = p
L
1 = e
−(1+0.01a)µ, (19)
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FIG. 3: Secret key rate R per pulse as a function of the
overall channel transmission η. From top to bottom, we
plot the key rates for the cases of 0, 1, 3, and 5%
intensity fluctuations under ebit = 1%.
which results in
t =
(√
e−(1−0.01a)µ −
√
e−(1+0.01a)µ
)2
4
. (20)
The upper bound on the probability that a single block of
three pulses contains n or more photons for n ∈ {1, 2, 3}
is written as
qn =
∞∑
ν=n
e−3µ(1+0.01a)[3µ(1 + 0.01a)]ν/ν!. (21)
In the simulation, we suppose fEC = h(ebit) and the de-
tection rate Q = 2ηµe−2ηµ. With this setup, in Fig. 3,
we show the results of the key rate by setting ebit = 1%
and by varying the amount of intensity fluctuations of
a = 0, 1, 3 and 5. Fig. 3 reveals that even if the vacuum
emission probabilities fluctuate for both bits, such fluc-
tuations do not have a significant impact on the degra-
dation of the key rate.
VII. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
In this paper, we have provided an information-
theoretic security proof of the DPS QKD protocol with
any two i.i.d. states. The feature of our QKD protocol
is that it starts from characterizing the photon-number
statistics of the emitted signals up to three-photons based
on the characterization method [18]. After the photon-
number statistics are estimated, our DPS protocol [19] is
conducted, whose secret key rate depend on the charac-
terized statistics. Since this work significantly expands
the light sources that can be securely employed in the
QKD protocol, it paves a significant step toward truly
secure quantum communication.
Note that the identicalness assumption supposed in our
model of the light source is not necessary. Even if the
light source emits non-identical states, as long as Eqs. (2),
(3) and (4) hold for any state, the same argument holds.
The independence assumption, on the other hand, is a
crucial one for proving the security. It might be possible
to remove this assumption by using our recent technique
in [22] that can incorporate correlations among the emit-
ted pulses. However, we leave this question in a future
work.
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Appendix A: Proof of Theorem 1
1. Notations
We first summarize the notations used in this Ap-
pendix.
Pˆ [|ψ〉] := |ψ〉〈ψ| (A1)
for a vector |ψ〉 that is not necessarily normalized, and
the Kronecker delta
δx,y :=
{
1 x = y
0 x 6= y. (A2)
The Z-basis states of Alice’s auxiliary qubit system A :=
A1A2A3 is defined as
|z〉A :=
3⊗
i=1
|zi〉Ai (A3)
with z := z1z2z3 and zi ∈ {0, 1}, and wt(z) denotes
the Hamming weight of a bit string z. Furthermore, we
define the projector Pˆa (with 0 ≤ a ≤ 3) as
Pˆa :=
∑
z:wt(z)=a
Pˆ [|z〉A]. (A4)
2. POVM elements
Here, we introduce the formulas of POVM elements
for detecting the bit kB at the j
th time slot when the
detected event occurs, the occurrence of bit error and
phase error. Each of all the formulas are exactly the
same as those in [19], and all the detailed derivations are
referred to [19].
We first introduce the POVM elements that corre-
spond to detecting the bit kB at the j
th (j ∈ {1, 2})
time slot when the detected event occurs at step (P2) in
6the actual protocol. For this, we consider the following
procedures to learn whether the event is detected or not
prior to determining kB and j. Bob puts the first (third)
pulse to the first beam splitter in Bob’s measurement unit
and keeps the pulse passing through the long (short) arm,
which we call first half pulse (third half pulse), while he
keeps the second pulse as it is. Then, Bob performs the
quantum non-demolition (QND) measurement to learn
the total photon number among the first and third half
pulses and the second pulse. The detected event is equiv-
alent to obtaining one-photon in this measurement. If the
QND measurement reveals one-photon, the state of Bob’s
system is spanned by the orthonormal basis {|i〉B}3i=1
with |i〉B denoting the position of the single-photon at
the first (third) half pulse for i = 1 (3) and at the origi-
nal second pulse for i = 2. If the detected event occurs,
the POVM element {Πˆj,kB}j,kB for detecting the bit kB
at the jth time slot (1 ≤ j ≤ 2) is given by
Πˆj,kB = Pˆ [|Πj,kB 〉B ] (A5)
with
|Πj,kB 〉B :=
√
wj |j〉B + (−1)kB√wj+1|j + 1〉B√
2
. (A6)
Here, w1 = w3 = 1 and w2 = 1/2.
Next, we show the formulas of the bit and phase error
POVM elements eˆbit and eˆph. Importantly, these are
defined only on systems A and B, and the assumptions
on emitted system S does not come into their expressions.
Since the only difference between our proof and the one
in [19] lies in whether trρˆ0|vac〉〈vac| = trρˆ1|vac〉〈vac| is
assumed or not, we can employ the same expressions of
eˆbit and eˆph as those in [19]. From [19], we have
eˆbit =
2∑
j=1
eˆjbit, eˆph =
2∑
j=1
eˆjph (A7)
with
eˆjbit = (Pˆ [|+ +〉AjAj+1 ] + Pˆ [| − −〉AjAj+1 ])⊗ Πˆj,1
+ (Pˆ [|+−〉AjAj+1 ] + Pˆ [| −+〉AjAj+1 ])⊗ Πˆj,0 (A8)
and
eˆjph =
∑
z
Pˆ [|z〉A]
⊗
[
wjδzj+1,1Pˆ [|j〉B ] + wj+1δzj ,1Pˆ [|j + 1〉B ]
]
. (A9)
When σˆ denotes a state of Alice and Bob’s systems A
and B just after the QND measurement reveals exactly
one photon, the probability of having a bit (phase) error
is given by trσˆeˆbit (trσˆeˆph).
3. Relation between bit and phase error rates
Here, we derive the relation between the bit error rate
ebit and the phase error rate eph. For this, we first employ
Lemmas 1 and 2 in [19] and obtain the following relation
between the probabilities of having a phase error and a
bit error, which holds for any σˆ:
treˆphσˆ ≤ λ
(
treˆbitσˆ +
√
(trσˆPˆ1)(trσˆPˆ3)
)
+
3∑
a=2
trPˆaσˆ.
(A10)
Here, λ := 3 +
√
5. Although, this inequality is com-
posed of probabilities, Eq. (A10) can be transformed to
the inequality with the corresponding numbers by using
the Azuma’s inequality [23]. If we apply the Azuma’s
inequality to the sum of the bit- and phase-error prob-
abilities and the sum of trσˆPˆ1, trσˆPˆ3 and trPˆa≥2σˆ over
Ndet number of detected events, we have
eph ≤ λebit + λ
√
NNdeta=1
Ndet
NNdeta=3
Ndet
+
NNdeta≥2
Ndet
(A11)
in the asymptotically large Ndet. Here, N
Ndet
a (with
1 ≤ a ≤ 3) denotes the number of detected events when
Alice obtains the outcome a by measuring system A. As
{NNdeta }3a=1 are not experimentally available, we need to
take their upper-bounds using MNema (with 1 ≤ a ≤ 3)
that represents the number of emitted blocks when Al-
ice obtains the outcome a by measuring system A. In so
doing, we obtain
eph ≤ λebit + λ
Q
√
MNema=1
Nem
MNema=3
Nem
+
1
Q
MNema≥2
Nem
. (A12)
Once we obtain the following upper bounds
Pr{wt(z) = 3} ≤ sU3 , (A13)
Pr{wt(z) = 1} ≤ sU1 , (A14)
Pr{wt(z) ≥ 2} ≤ sU≥2, (A15)
which are determined in the next subsection, the Cher-
noff bound gives
MNema=3
Nem
≤ sU3 + χ, (A16)
MNema=1
Nem
≤ sU1 + χ, (A17)
MNema≥2
Nem
≤ sU≥2 + χ. (A18)
If the number Nem of emitted blocks gets larger for any
fixed χ > 0, the probability of violating each inequality
decreases exponentially. Under the asymptotic limit of
large Nem, we neglect χ in the following discussions. By
7substituting Eqs. (A16)-(A18) to Eq. (A12), we finally
obtain
eph ≤ λebit +
sU≥2
Q
+
λ
√
sU1 s
U
3
Q
, (A19)
which ends the proof of Theorem 1.
4. Derivations of sU3 , s
U
1 and s
U
≥2
Here, we prove that sU3 , s
U
1 and s
U
≥2 can be expressed
as Eqs. (14), (15) and (16), respectively.
a. Derivation of sU3
Let nblock :=
∑3
j=1 nj denote the number of photons
in a single-block of pulses with nj being the number of
photons contained in system Sj . Then, Pr{wt(z) = 3} is
calculated as
Pr{wt(z) = 3} =
2∑
nblock=0
Pr{nblock,wt(z) = 3}
+
∞∑
nblock=3
Pr{nblock,wt(z) = 3}
≤
2∑
nblock=0
Pr{nblock,wt(z) = 3}+ q3, (A20)
where we use Bayes’ theorem in the the equality and use
Eq. (4) in the inequality.
Below, we calculate Pr{nblock,wt(z) = 3} for nblock ∈
{0, 1, 2}. We first calculate Pr{nblock = 0,wt(z) = 3}:
Pr{nblock = 0,wt(z) = 3}
=
3∏
j=1
Pr{nj = 0, zj = 1}
=
3∏
j=1
Pr{nj = 0|zj = 1}Pr{zj = 1}. (A21)
From Eq. (10), if zj = 1, the j
th state of systems Sj and
Rj can be written as
|Φ−〉SjRj = (|ψ0〉SjRj − |ψ1〉SjRj )/N (A22)
with
|N |2 = 2(1− Re 〈ψ1|ψ0〉). (A23)
For state |Φ〉ASR in Eq. (10), the probability of obtaining
zj = 1 is expressed as
Pr{zj = 1} = |N |2/4. (A24)
By expanding the orthonormal basis of system Sj with
the photon number states, |ψ0〉SjRj and |ψ1〉SjRj can be
respectively written as
|ψ0〉SjRj
=
√
P vacj,0 |vac〉Sj |u0〉Rj +
√
P 1j,0|1〉Sj |u1〉Rj + · · · ,
(A25)
|ψ1〉SjRj
=
√
P vacj,1 |vac〉Sj |v0〉Rj +
√
P 1j,1|1〉Sj |v1〉Rj + · · · (A26)
with
P vacj,bAj
:= trρˆ
bAj
Sj
|vac〉〈vac|Sj (A27)
and
P 1j,bAj
:= trρˆ
bAj
Sj
|1〉〈1|Sj . (A28)
Here, |u0〉, |u1〉, |v0〉 and |v1〉 are normalized vectors of
system Rj . Since a purification |ψbAj 〉SjRj of ρˆ
bAj
Sj
has a
freedom of choosing a unitary on system Rj , we take
|v0〉 as |v0〉 = |u0〉. Using Eqs. (A22), (A25) and (A26)
derives
Pr{nj = 0|zj = 1} =
(
√
P vacj,0 −
√
P vacj,1 )
2
|N |2 . (A29)
By substituting Eqs. (A24) and (A29) to Eq. (A21), we
obtain
Pr{nblock = 0,wt(z) = 3} =
3∏
j=1
(√
P vacj,0 −
√
P vacj,1
2
)2
.
(A30)
Through characterization of the light source, as we have
the bounds on the vacuum emission probabilities, the
following inequality holds for any j ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
Pr{nj = 0, zj = 1} =
(√
P vacj,0 −
√
P vacj,1
2
)2
≤
max
{
(
√
pU0 −
√
pL1 )
2, (
√
pL0 −
√
pU1 )
2
}
4
=: t (A31)
Therefore, Eq. (A21) leads to
Pr{nblock = 0,wt(z) = 3} ≤ t3. (A32)
Next, we calculate Pr{nblock = 1,wt(z) = 3}. From
Eq. (A31), we obtain
Pr{nblock = 1,wt(z) = 3}
≤Pr{n1 = 0, z1 = 1}Pr{n2 = 0, z2 = 1}
+Pr{n1 = 0, z1 = 1}Pr{n3 = 0, z3 = 1}
+Pr{n2 = 0, z2 = 1}Pr{n3 = 0, z3 = 1}
≤3t2. (A33)
8Finally, we calculate Pr{nblock = 2,wt(z) = 3}.
Pr{nblock = 2,wt(z) = 3}
≤Pr{n1 = 0, z1 = 1}Pr{n2 = 0, z2 = 1}
+Pr{n1 = 0, z1 = 1}Pr{n3 = 0, z3 = 1}
+Pr{n2 = 0, z2 = 1}Pr{n3 = 0, z3 = 1}
+
3∑
j=1
Pr{nj = 0, zj = 1}
≤3t2 + 3t. (A34)
Substituting Eqs. (A32), (A33) and (A34) to Eq. (A20)
gives
Pr{wt(z) = 3} ≤ q3 + t3 + 6t2 + 3t =: sU3 . (A35)
b. Derivation of sU1
Here, we prove that sU1 is expressed as Eq. (15).
Pr{wt(z) = 1} = Pr{nblock = 0,wt(z) = 1}
+
∞∑
nblock=1
Pr{nblock,wt(z) = 1}
≤Pr{nblock = 0,wt(z) = 1}+ q1, (A36)
where we use Bayes’ theorem in the the equality and use
Eq. (4) in the inequality.
Below, we calculate Pr{nblock = 0,wt(z) = 1}. From
Eq. (A31), we obtain
Pr{nblock = 0,wt(z) = 1} ≤
3∑
j=1
Pr{nj = 0, zj = 1}
≤ 3t. (A37)
Substituting Eq. (A37) to Eq. (A36) gives
Pr{wt(z) = 1} ≤ q1 + 3t =: sU1 . (A38)
c. Derivation of sU≥2
Here, we prove that sU≥2 is expressed as Eq. (16).
Pr{wt(z) ≥ 2} =
1∑
nblock=0
Pr{nblock,wt(z) ≥ 2}
+Pr{nblock ≥ 2,wt(z) ≥ 2}
≤
1∑
nblock=0
Pr{nblock,wt(z) ≥ 2}+ q2, (A39)
where we use Bayes’ theorem in the the equality and
use Eq. (4) in the inequality. Below, we calculate
Pr{nblock,wt(z) ≥ 2} for nblock ∈ {0, 1}. From Eq (A32),
we have
Pr{nblock = 0,wt(z) ≥ 2}
≤Pr{nblock = 0,wt(z) = 2}+ t3. (A40)
By using Eq. (A31), it is straightforward to show that
Pr{nblock = 0,wt(z) = 2} is upper bounded as
Pr{nblock = 0,wt(z) = 2}
≤Pr{n1 = 0, z1 = 1}Pr{n2 = 0, z2 = 1}
+Pr{n1 = 0, z1 = 1}Pr{n3 = 0, z3 = 1}
+Pr{n2 = 0, z2 = 1}Pr{n3 = 0, z3 = 1}
≤3t2. (A41)
Hence,
Pr{nblock = 0,wt(z) ≥ 2} ≤ 3t2 + t3. (A42)
Finally, we calculate Pr{nblock = 1,wt(z) ≥ 2}. From
Eq. (A33), we obtain
Pr{nblock = 1,wt(z) ≥ 2}
≤Pr{nblock = 1,wt(z) = 2}+ 3t2. (A43)
By using Eq. (A31), Pr{nblock = 1,wt(z) = 2} is upper
bounded as
Pr{nblock = 1,wt(z) = 2} ≤ 3(2t+ t2). (A44)
Hence,
Pr{nblock = 1,wt(z) ≥ 2} ≤ 6t+ 6t2. (A45)
Substituting Eqs. (A42) and (A45) to Eq. (A39) gives
the upper bound on Pr{wt(z) ≥ 2} as
Pr{wt(z) ≥ 2} ≤ q2 + t3 + 9t2 + 6t =: sU≥2. (A46)
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